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1962/11/13

AEA Martin

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6. In this connection, Mikoyan's speech last night in Havana, in which he endorsed Castro's unacceptable five points, was not at all helpful. We hope that he is being more helpful in private.

Approved by Mr. Ball

11/13/62

[Signature]

TOP SECRET

[REDACTED]

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EC:nmb

Eyes only *DOWNGRADE* *SECRET* *221*

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW

EX A - Caption removed, transferred to OFFADRC

EX B - Transferred to OFFADRC with additional access controlled by S/S

EX C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: *Elijah Kelly Jr.*

Date: *3/13/92*


TO: *U - Mr. Ball*

19-*92*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
November 13, 1962

BIAS

SU, G, AFA Martin



FROM : IO - Harlan Cleveland

SUBJECT: Supplementary Instructions for Messrs. Stevenson and McCloy.

planned to be 11/13 1962 - 9

1. The meeting at 3:00 p.m. is being held at Kuznetsov's request. The character of the meeting can therefore be developed from the opening presentation by the Soviets.
2. The Secretary has orally authorized Mr. McCloy to discuss, if it comes up naturally in the conversation, the substance of the message sent to the Soviets last night: that if they will give us assurances that the IL-28 bombers will be removed from Cuba, within, say, three weeks, we are prepared to lift the quarantine forthwith without awaiting the actual removal of the bombers. We will, of course, observe the removal closely through aerial photography.
3. The Secretary has asked that if the discussion of this point leads to complications, including the character of U.S. assurances and the need for long-term safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, Messrs. Stevenson and McCloy are to refer the questions back to Washington for consideration by the NSC and the President.
4. If Kuznetsov is not familiar with the message, or with the channel being used for its transmission, the U.S. negotiators should not enlighten him.
5. On assurances, present U.S. position can be simply stated: the President has already given a non-invasion assurance (to which Khrushchev has already referred publicly on several occasions.). This non-invasion assurance is of

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
TO: *U - Mr. Ball*

19-*92*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY: *Prosser* DATE: *4/11/88*

SECRET *course*



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